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tion that a manufacturer, and to a lesser extent a seller, was
aware of a hidden defect; and if this presumption is not over-
come the purchaser has a right to rescission and to damages.
If the presumption is rebutted, the plaintiff can obtain only
rescission and reimbursement of expenses caused by the sale.
(2) Recovery on the contract can be severely restricted by limi-
tations in the contract on the seller's warranty, although limi-
tations on liability, whether on tort or on contract, are strictly
construed and may not be valid in cases where the manufac-
turer or seller was deemed to have acted in bad faith. Further-
more, the law itself stipulates a short period of limitations upon
which a plaintiff can sue.
(3) Where the purchase contract does not otherwise preclude his
doing so, the plaintiff-purchaser can avail himself of a tort
theory. Subsequent purchasers would appear to have a choice
of suing on a tort or contract basis; and, of course, persons
having no contractual connection whatever with the manu-
facturer or seller can sue only on a tort theory.
(4) The principal difficulty with the tort theory is the necessity
of proving fault, except in the special case where the defend-
ant is a so-called "guardian."
England
I. ARNOLD Ross *
The hard and fast rule reached in Winterbottom v. Wright 1
in 1842, that privity of contract must exist between manufacturer
and seller as a condition to holding the former liable for a condition
not readily viewable, and that a third party could not recover damages
from the manufacturer because of latent defect in his product, was
the standard in England for almost 90 years before the English courts
reexamined the problem in the light of changes in thinking. In
Winterbottom the plaintiff, a mail coach driver employed by a con-
* The author is a member of the Bars of New York and the District of
Columbia. He has received the degree of J.D. from New York University,
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New York, City College.
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tractor who had agreed to convey the mail bags along a certain route,
sought to recover damages for an injury he sustained when the coach
broke down because of latent defects in its construction. He brought
his action against the supplier of the coach to the Postmaster General.
The court found that the supplier of the coach owed no duty to the
driver. That conclusion was the basis of the decision in Earl v.
Lubbock,2 decided in 1905, in denying to a third party any relief
against a manufacturer or supplier of the product with the latent
defect.
In 1916 Judge Benjamin N. Cardoza of the New York Court
of Appeals broke the impact of that rule, which had been followed in
New York, in writing for that Court in Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor
Co.' that third parties may hold a manufacturer liable for articles
which would be dangerous if negligently made. It was not until 1932
that the British House of Lords by a divided court of 3 to 2 in
M'Allister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson 4 held a manufacturer liable
to third parties for the manufacture of articles which were dangerous
owing to unknown defects.
A proper discussion of the subject requires consideration of the
pertinent provisions of contract and negligence law as they are applied
in England.
Contract Law
Parties to a contractual relationship may exclude by express
terms the warranty requiring fair warning of the probable danger
owing to unknown defects; by such a disclaimer a manufacturer would
then escape any judgment for damages flowing from that warranty,'
although the English courts are reluctant to construe a contract to
effect that result.'
The English cases treating this subject have held to a strict
construction of the contract between the parties, when liability was
based on a breach of warranty, and the article in question was likely
to be dangerous to those who might come in contact with it. In 1912
in Blacker v. Lake and Elliot, Ltd.,7 the court held that it, and not a
jury, should conclude whether the article in question was dangerous
2 [1905] 1 K. B. 253.
3217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
4 [1932] A. C. 562 (H. L.).
- Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71.
6 Lowe v. Lombank, Ltd., [1960] 1 All E. R. 611.
7 106 L. T. 533 (D. C. 1912).
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and that such determination pertained to a question of law. It further
held that a manufacturer of an article, whose dangerous nature he
has declared or is apparent, is under no obligation to a third person
who is injured because of imperfect manufacture. A person knowingly
dealing with an article of a dangerous nature has a duty to warn
the person to whom he has handed or delivered the article of the
potential danger, as well as a duty to warn those who, to his knowl-
edge, might use it. The liability of the seller is limited to the pur-
chaser or the one whom the purchaser mentioned as its user and not
to a recipient, other than those mentioned, to whom the seller might
deliver or permit use of the article if it was not a dangerous thing of
itself. That part of the opinion which pertained to the liability of the
manufacturer to third persons is no longer the view of the courts.
According to the law of negligence, a person who manufactures
and sells an article owes a duty to take reasonable care in its design
and manufacture.8 This requirement extends to motor vehicles.' The
duty arises when the manufacturer sells the article in such a form as
to show that he intended that it reach the user without reasonable
likelihood of an intermediate examination which would have revealed
the danger." Knowledge of the defect by the user precludes liability
of the manufacturer." His duty is discharged by giving a warning
of the defect or dangerous characteristic to a competent person. 12
The manufacturer's or supplier's liability does not arise if a probable
examination by the user at the time of purchase is likely to disclose
the danger and he can be held liable, in the absence of notice, if
discovery of the defect becomes known only after use. 3 The user
must employ the article for the purpose originally disclosed and not
for a materially different one.
Negligence Law
Lord Justice Thankerton of the House of Lords, in M'Allister
(or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, 4 supra, stated the requirements for
negligence actions by third persons against manufacturers or suppliers
of products which have latent defects or dangerous characteristics.
M'Allister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562 (H. L.).
9 Donnelly v. Glasgow Corp., [1953] Sess. Cas. 107.
'
0 London Graving Dock Co. v. Horton, [1951] A. C. 737, at 750 (H. L.).
11 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A. C. 85, at 105 (P. C.).
12 Holmes v. Ashford, [1950] 2 All E. R. 76; Bottomley v. Bannister, [1932]
1 K. B. 458, at 473.
13 Denny v. Supplies and Transport Co., [1951] 2 K. B. 374.
14 M'Allister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562 (H. L.).
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That case, which has been cited in more than one hundred later
decisions, was brought by a consumer against the manufacturer of
ginger beer. A sealed bottle of ginger beer contained a snail which
rendered the product dangerous and harmful, and the plaintiff suffered
substantial damages from drinking it. The court awarded the plain-
tiff compensation, Lord Justice Thankerton and Lord Macmillan
differing somewhat on the basis for liability. Noting that no contract
existed and that the offensive article was not in itself dangerous, the
Lord Justice stated that liability arose only if a "special relationship
of duty" existed between the manufacturer and the consumer. The
Lord Justice found such a relationship in the facts that the product
was made solely for ultimate purchase by a consumer and that the
method of packaging-by sealed bottle-excluded interference with or
examination of the article by intermediate handlers. Lord Macmillan
preferred to emphasize that the product was made for consumption;
he offered a general rule that a manufacturer regularly processing
food products always owes a general duty toward his customers.
Both justices, of course, required a proof of negligence and expressly
assumed the possibility of a defense of intervening causation through
the actions of intervening third parties, such as wholesalers and
retailers.
Although both rationale have been put forward in later cases,
the Lord Justice's arguments, having broader applicability, seem to
dominate later product liability cases, and several courts have brought
his standards to bear in cases involving motor vehicles. For instance, it
has been held that the duty to disclose latent defects and possible dan-
ger in the use of motor vehicles extends to those who for a considera-
tion assemble parts ' or repair the product."6 Dealers who sell or rent
them may be liable for defects or dangerous characteristics.' Liability
extends also to those who lend their article for the sole benefit of the
lender." Where special precautions are required, the degree of care
required almost amounts to a guaranty of safety. 10
In Malfroot v. Noxal, Ltd.,2 ' decided in 1935, the plaintiff had
a sidecar fitted to his motorcycle. Shortly after leaving the shop
"5 Malfroot v. Noxal, Ltd., 51 T. L. R. 551 (1935).
16 Stennett v. Hancock and Perry, [1939] 2 All E. R. 578; Herschtal v. Stewart
and Ardern, Ltd., [1940] 1 K. B. 155.
'7 White v. Steadman, [1913] 3 K. B. 340.
18 Chapman (or Oliver) v. Saddler & Co., [1929] A. C. 584 (H. L.).
19 M'Allister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562 (H. L.).
2041T. L. R. 551 (1935).
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where the attachment was made, the sidecar detached from the motor-
cycle, and the plaintiff and his lady passenger were injured. The
court held that the defendents were liable to the male occupant, both
in negligence and in contract, and to the female plaintiff in tort.
Herschetal v. Stewart & Arden, Ltd., 21 was a 1939 motor vehicle
case in which the court applied the principle stated in M'Allister (or
Donoghue) v. Stevenson to suppliers and repairers of motor vehicles.
The defendants had sold to the plaintiff a reconditioned automobile.
The morning after its receipt the plaintiff, in using it for his business,
and while turning a corner, was injured because a rear wheel came off
the car. The court held that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
to see to it that the wheels were properly affixed to the car, that the
motor vehicle was free of any defects which would prevent normal
use by the plaintiff, and that it was in a safe condition. The Court
held that where an article is known to be required for immediate use,
the test of liability in an action for negligence resulting from a defect
in the article is not whether the injured party had an opportunity for
intermediate examination, but whether such an examination could
reasonably be anticipated by the supplier. A negative conclusion to
such reasonable anticipation made the supplier liable for the negli-
gence.
The amount of time that passed from purchase to discovery of
the defect of auto parts has a bearing on the supplier's liability. In
Evans v. Triplex Safety Glass Co.,2 2 decided in 1936, the plaintiff had
bought a car fitted with a Triplex Toughened Safety Glass windshield
which the defendants had manufactured. Plaintiff suffered an injury
when the windshield broke. The Court held that a manufacturer would
not be liable ( 1) when there was a material lapse of time between the
purchase of the car with the equipment and the accident, (2) if there
was the possibility that the glass might have been strained when screwed
into its frame, (3) when there was an opportunity for examination
by the intermediate seller, and (4) if the breaking of the glass might
have been caused by something other than a defect in manufacture.
Andrews v. Hopkinson,2 ' decided in 1956, presented in interest-
ing situation. The plaintiff in that case had visited the showroom of a
car dealer and evinced a desire to purchase a second-hand car. On
the basis of representations by defendant's sales manager ("It's a
21 [1940] 1 K. B. 155.
22 [1936] 1 All E. R. 283.
23 [1957] 1 Q. B. 229.
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good little bus. I would stake my life on it. You will have no
trouble with it"), plaintiff decided to purchase the car on time pay-
ments. The dealer then sold the car to a finance company, and the
latter in turn sold it to the buyer on the agreed terms. Eight days
after purchase, the car collided with a motor bus because of a failure
in the drag-link joint of the steering mechanism. The car was not safe
or fit for use on the highway. The owner brought an action against the
dealer, and the Court held: (1) that despite the circuitous method
by which plaintiff acquired the car, he could hold the dealer on the
warranty that the car was in good condition; (2) that the damages
recoverable, despite the normal limits for a breach of warranty,
should include those for the personal injury which flowed from the
consequences of the breach; and (3) that the defendent was also
liable in negligence for delivering a car in dangerous condition, in
light of the facts that the defect could have been discovered by
reasonable diligence and defendant failed either to have the car
examined or to warn the plaintiff that it had not been examined.
The relatively few negligence cases based on hidden defects in
motor vehicles are attributable to the firm stand the British Parliament
has taken concerning vehicle construction and use which is spelled
out in the Road Traffic Act of 1960.24 Its 271 sections, which con-
solidated the provisions of various prior enactments and provided
additional safeguards enforceable in England, Scotland, and Wales,
include provisions which make it criminal to violate the statute and
empower local prosecutors to enforce the statute.
The pertinent provisions applicable to the construction and use
of motor vehicles and the necessary equipment thereof are set out in
sections 64 through 69. They include provisions regulating the con-
struction, weight, equipment, and use of vehicles; for conducting tests
to establish the road worthiness of vehicles; requiring such test certifi-
cates to be obtained; and prohibiting the sale of vehicles in unroad-
worthy condition. 5
248 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 16.
25 Authority to regulate the construction of motor vehicles is detailed in sec-
tion 64 which states:
"Regulation of construction, weight, equipment and use of vehicles.
(1) The Minister may make regulations generally as to the use of motor
vehicles and trailers on roads, their construction and equipment and the condi-
tions under which they may be so used, and in particular, but without preju-
dice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, may make regulations with
respect to any of the following matters:-
(a) the width, height and length of motor vehicles and trailers and the load
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Conclusion
Product liability, as applied to motor vehicles in Great Britain,
is now firmly established. The relatively few cases which reach the
courts is the result of the effective regulations which appropriate
carried thereby, the diameter of wheels, and the width, nature and condi-
tion of tyres, of motor vehicles and trailers;
(b) the consumption of smoke and the emission of visible vapour, sparks,
ashes and grit;
(c) excessive noise owing to the design or condition of a vehicle, or the load-
ing thereof;
(d) the maximum weight unladen of heavy motor cars, and the maximum
weight laden of motor vehicles and trailers, and the maximum weight to
be transmitted to the road or any specified area therof by a motor
vehicle or trailer of any class or description or by any part or parts of
such a vehicle or trailer in contact with the road, and the conditions
under which the weights may be required to be tested;
(e) the particulars to be marked on motor vehicles and trailers;
(f) the towing of or drawing of vehicles by motor vehicles;
(g) the number and nature of brakes, and for securing that brakes, silencers
and steering gear shall be efficient and kept in proper working order;
(h) the testing and inspection, by persons authorised by or under the regula-
tions, of the brakes, silencers, steering gear, tyres, lighting equipment and
reflectors of motor vehicles and trailers on any premises where they are,
subject however to the consent of the owner of the premises;
(i) the appliances to be fitted for signalling the approach of a motor vehicle,
or enabling the driver of a motor vehicle to become aware of the ap-
proach of another vehicle from the rear, or for intimating any intended
change of speed or direction of a motor vehicle, and the use of any such
appliance, and for securing that they shall be efficient and kept in proper
working order;
(j) for prohibiting the use of appliances fitted to motor vehicles for signalling
their approach, being appliances for signalling by sound, at any times, or
on or in any roads or localities, specified in the regulations;
and different regulations may be made as respects different classes or descrip-
tions of vehicles or as respects the same class or description of vehicles in dif-
ferent circumstances and, in the case of regulations made for the purpose spe-
cified in paragraph (j) of this subsection, as respects different times of the
day or night and as respects roads in different localities.
(2) Subjecf to the provisions of this section, it shall not be lawful to use on a
road a motor vehicle or trailer which does not comply with any such regula-
tions as aforesaid, applicable to the class or description of vehicles to which
the vehicle belongs, as to the construction, weight and equipment thereof;
and a person who uses a motor vehicle or trailer in contravention of this
subsection, or causes or permits the vehicle to be so used, shall be liable on
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or in the case
of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months.
(3) Where any such regulations as aforesaid contain provisions varying the
requirements as regards the construction or weight of any class or description
of vehicles, provision shall be made by the regulations for exempting for such
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